The case of State of New Jersey v. Bennie Eugene Bridges involved the conviction of the defendant for conspiracy and several crimes, including murder. The Appellate Division affirmed the conspiracy conviction but reversed the substantive criminal convictions, ruling that a co-conspirator's liability for substantive crimes requires specific intent. The State appealed the decision, and the dissenting opinion stated that a conspirator can be vicariously liable for the substantive crimes of co-conspirators if their commission of those crimes was foreseeable as a natural consequence of the conspiracy.

The defendant attended a birthday party where he had an argument with another guest and left, threatening to return with his "boys." He met two co-defendants and asked them to accompany him to the party. They briefly stopped at one of the co-defendant's house, and upon returning to the car, they told defendant that they had "some stuff for the guys" at the party, which defendant understood to mean guns or knives. The co-defendants told defendant that they were carrying guns "so they'll stay back." Defendant believed the guns were necessary to intimidate the majority of the boys at the party.

During the fight, one person was killed, and another was injured when the co-defendants drew their guns and fired into the crowd. The case highlights the issue of vicarious liability for substantive crimes committed by co-conspirators and the requirement of specific intent for such liability. The lower court erred in convicting the defendant for substantive crimes without specific intent.

The case of Bridges raises questions about criminal liability in conspiracy cases. The majority ruled that a co-conspirator must share the same intent as the perpetrator to be liable for the crime, while the dissent believed liability extends to crimes that are a natural and probable consequence of the conspiracy. The legal standard for vicarious liability of co-conspirators under N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6b(4) requires a limited rule of liability based on objective foreseeability and ordinary consequences of the conspiracy. The jury instruction in this case did not sufficiently present this standard to the jury, and the question remains whether the evidence would permit a jury to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of murder based on their participation in the conspiracy.

The defendant was convicted of conspiracy to commit aggravated assault and possess firearms unlawfully, and the jury's conviction on the substantive crimes was reasonable. However, the Pinkerton doctrine's interpretation in this case is problematic because murder cannot be in furtherance of a conspiracy to carry and threaten people with weapons. The suggested instructions for narrowing the scope of conspirator liability still fail to require the jury to find an essential element of Pinkerton liability. The defendant's sentence was extreme and based on a negligent mental state. The case is sent back for further proceedings. The law now punishes conspiracy to commit an offense less severely than the completed offense, which can lead to illogical outcomes. The case was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.