The legal case concerns the use of collateral estoppel in subsequent legal actions involving the same issue of fact that was previously decided against a party in an equitable action. The doctrine of collateral estoppel aims to prevent parties from re-litigating the same issue with the same party or their privy and to promote judicial economy. The mutuality of parties doctrine, which required both parties to be bound by a prior judgment, was abandoned in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation. The article discusses the potential unfairness of offensive collateral estoppel to defendants and suggests that trial courts should have discretion in deciding when to apply it. In this case, the use of offensive collateral estoppel is appropriate since the respondent could not have joined the previous action, and there is no unfairness to the petitioners in applying it. The District Court erred in denying the respondent's motion for partial summary judgment against the petitioners, citing the petitioners' Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial.

The dissenting opinion in a securities fraud case argues that the Court of Appeals' endorsement of a "heads I win, tails you lose" theory erodes the right to a jury trial guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment. The dissent emphasizes the importance of preserving the right to a jury trial in civil cases, which was highly valued by the colonists and was considered the only universally secured right in the first American state constitutions. The Seventh Amendment requires the preservation of the right to trial by jury, evaluated based on historical standards. Any procedural change that limits the province of the jury to a greater degree than allowed at common law is in direct violation of the Amendment. The use of collateral estoppel cannot limit the right to a jury trial guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment, and eliminating the right to a jury trial entirely violates the Amendment. The Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a jury trial is essential in both criminal and civil cases, and procedural reforms that violate this right should be avoided. The use of offensive collateral estoppel against a party who did not have the opportunity to have their case decided by a jury is unjust. The author opposes estopping the petitioners in this case from re-litigating the issues before a jury in the private action, citing several factors that support this position. The author believes that today's decision will result in defendants losing the right to a jury trial in many private cases, without any compelling reasons to do so.