The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 allows states to dispose of low-level radioactive waste generated within their borders, either alone or in cooperation with other states. The Act provides monetary incentives to encourage compliance with deadlines for developing and operating waste disposal facilities. However, the Act cannot force states to provide for the disposal of radioactive waste, but can encourage them to do so. The legal challenge to the constitutionality of the incentives provided by the Act is based on the Tenth Amendment and the Guarantee Clause. The Tenth Amendment limits the power of the federal government and confirms that the power of the federal government is subject to limits that may reserve power to the states. The case at issue questions whether provisions of the Act exceed the boundary between federal and state authority. The Supreme Court ruled that the first and second sets of incentives in the Act are constitutional and within Congress' authority under the Commerce and Spending Clauses. However, the take title provision is coercive and unconstitutional as it infringes upon the core of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment.

The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of incentives for states that comply with the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, but struck down the "take title" provision. Justice White dissented, arguing that the public policy problem should have been considered. The Act and its amendment were the result of state leaders' efforts to achieve state-based solutions to the waste problem. The lower court did not err in considering this recommendation. The 1980 Act declared that each state is responsible for providing capacity for the disposal of low-level radioactive waste generated within its borders. The lower court did not err in considering this information. The 1985 Act was a product of cooperative federalism, where States bargained among themselves to achieve compromises for Congress to sanction. However, the Supreme Court's analysis of the constitutionality of the take title provision in New York v. United States was flawed. The Court failed to understand the provision's place in the interstate bargaining process and wrongly took away Congress' authority to sanction noncompliant states. The author suggests that estoppel should be applied because New York benefited from the 1985 Act. The Court's analysis of state sovereignty and the Tenth Amendment is flawed, and its "anticommandeering" principle is not supported by prior precedents. The Court's distinction between federal laws of general applicability and those directed solely at the activities of States is not supported by prior precedents.

Justice Stevens argues that the Constitution grants the Federal Government the power to directly exercise legislative authority over individuals within the States, which is a greater intrusion on state sovereignty than the power granted under the Articles of Confederation. The Tenth Amendment does not limit Congress' exercise of its delegated powers under Article I, and federalism values do not require such a rule. The Supreme Court has the power to resolve disputes between states, including those related to interstate waters, and can command an upstream state that is polluting the waters of a downstream state to implement federal regulations. In cases where litigation arises between states that have entered into a compact, the Supreme Court has the power to enforce specific provisions.