The case of "Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County" questioned whether California's "statutory rape" law violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The law made only men criminally liable for sexual intercourse with a female under the age of 18 who is not the perpetrator's wife. The Supreme Court of California found that the law discriminated on the basis of sex but was justified by the compelling state interest of preventing teenage pregnancies. The court held that the gender classification was justified as a means of identifying offender and victim because only males could cause the result the law sought to avoid. The judgment of the California Supreme Court was affirmed. The California statute prohibiting males from having sexual intercourse with minor females is constitutional and not discriminatory against females. The statute is justified on the grounds that very young females are particularly susceptible to physical injury from sexual intercourse. Both sexes are prohibited from committing lewd or lascivious acts with a child under 14, and females may be charged with aiding and abetting the violation of Section 261.5. The statute does not violate the Equal Protection Clause because young women and men are not similarly situated with respect to the problems and risks associated with intercourse and pregnancy. The statute is realistically related to the legitimate state purpose of reducing those problems and risks.

The California statutory rape law prohibiting only males from engaging in sexual intercourse with a minor female is justifiable due to the physical risks for prepubescent females and is constitutional. However, some justices dissent, arguing that the gender-based classification is unconstitutional and the State must prove that a gender-neutral statute would be less effective in achieving the goal of preventing teenage pregnancy. The lawyer believes that the statute violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause and suggests reversing the California Supreme Court's decision. Justice Stevens dissents and believes that a selective prohibition based on sex is discriminatory and cannot be justified. The author also dissents, arguing that punishing only one participant and not the other, when they are equally guilty, is unfair and violates the constitutional requirement of impartial governance.