This legal case involves the requirements for establishing standing in a lawsuit challenging government action or inaction under the citizen-suit provision of the Endangered Species Act. The Court of Appeals found that the plaintiffs failed to establish imminent injury to themselves regarding the damage to endangered species habitats. The proposed "ecosystem nexus" standing theory is inconsistent with the ESA, and the "animal nexus" and "vocational nexus" standing theories require a factual showing of perceptible harm. The citizen-suit provision of the ESA does not create a "procedural right" to consultation in all "persons," allowing anyone to file suit to challenge the Secretary's failure to follow the correct consultative procedure, even if they cannot allege any discrete injury from that failure. To challenge the validity of executive or legislative action, a private individual must demonstrate a direct injury, rather than a generalized grievance. The court cannot intervene in this case, as doing so would be assuming authority over the governmental acts of another coequal department, which the court does not possess.

Justice Kennedy agrees with the Court's decision that the respondents have failed to demonstrate standing as they have not shown a concrete injury to support their claims. However, he disagrees with the Court's requirement for the respondents to acquire airline tickets or announce a return date. He notes that as government programs become more complex, new rights of action may arise, but Congress must identify the injury it seeks to vindicate and relate it to the class of persons entitled to bring suit. The citizen-suit provision of the Endangered Species Act does not meet these minimal requirements.

Justice Stevens agrees with the reversal of the case, but disagrees with the Court's decision that the respondents lack standing due to their threatened injury not being imminent. The author of the opinion believes that individuals who have a professional interest in preserving the habitat of an endangered species and intend to revisit it in the future have standing to challenge agency action that threatens its destruction. The Supreme Court plurality ruled that the respondents' injuries are not redressable in this litigation because they only sought a declaratory judgment and an injunction requiring the Secretary of the Interior to promulgate a new regulation requiring consultation for agency actions abroad. However, the writer agrees that the respondents have legal standing but supports the reversal of the judgment because the Government's argument that § 7(a)(2) does not apply to foreign activities is correct. The text of US law § 7(a)(2) does not indicate that it applies in foreign countries.

Justice Blackmun dissents from the Court's decision, arguing that the plaintiffs have raised genuine issues of fact regarding injury and redressability, which should have been sufficient to survive summary judgment. The Court clarifies the standard of proof required for respondents to survive a motion for summary judgment on standing, stating that respondents need only demonstrate a "genuine issue" of material fact as to standing, and not actual or imminent harm. The author believes that if the proper standard for summary judgment were applied, the sworn affidavits and deposition testimony of Joyce Kelly and Amy Skil-bred would create a genuine issue for trial regarding whether one or both would be imminently harmed by the Aswan and Mahaweli projects. The author argues that the Court erred in dismissing Kelly and Skilbred's statements of intent to revisit the project sites as insufficient to satisfy the "actual or imminent" injury standard. The author contends that a reasonable finder of fact could conclude, based on their past visits to the project sites and their professional backgrounds in wildlife preservation, that it was likely that Kelly and Skilbred would make a return trip to the project areas. The author argues that the action agencies should be prevented from re-litigating the extraterritorial scope of the § 7 consultation requirement, as they had a similar level of involvement in the litigation as the individual contractor whose litigation was financed and controlled by the Government. The author believes that a favorable decision would redress the injury suffered by the respondents. The author disputes the plurality's assertion that the respondents have not provided evidence that the named projects will do less harm to listed species if funding is eliminated. The author contends that the respondents have raised a genuine issue of fact that the projects harm endangered species and that the actions of AID and other United States agencies can mitigate that harm. The author argues that long-term funding in sufficient amounts is necessary to stem the negative impacts of the project and that donor agencies have authority to protect listed species.