The case involves the city of New London's plan to use eminent domain to acquire properties for economic revitalization. The Supreme Court of Connecticut upheld the lower court's decision that the takings were authorized by the State's municipal development statute and that economic development qualified as a valid public use under both the Federal and State Constitutions. However, the Superior Court erred in denying relief for some properties. The Court has rejected the literal requirement that condemned property be put into use for the general public and has embraced the broader interpretation of public use as "public purpose." The Court defers to legislative judgments in this area and has defined the concept of public purpose broadly. The City cannot take private property to benefit a specific private party or under the guise of a public purpose when the actual purpose is to benefit a private party. However, in this case, the City's taking of the property is part of a well-considered development plan, and there is no evidence of an illegitimate purpose. Therefore, the City's plan is not intended to benefit a particular group of individuals, and it is not a purely private taking.

The Public Use Clause allows a taking as long as it is rationally related to a conceivable public purpose. However, transfers that primarily benefit private entities and only incidentally benefit the public are not allowed. A court must strike down a taking that is intended to favor a particular private party with only incidental public benefits. The purpose of a taking for economic development must be evaluated to determine if the public purpose is only incidental to the benefits that will be conferred on private parties. The trial court correctly observed this in the case at hand. When faced with an accusation of impermissible favoritism towards private parties, a court must take it seriously and review the record to determine if it has merit. The government's actions are presumed to be reasonable and intended to serve a public purpose. The trial court conducted a thorough inquiry into whether the development plan primarily benefited the private developer and businesses, with only incidental benefit to the city. The court considered testimony from government officials and corporate officers, documentary evidence, and the commitment of public funds to the project before private beneficiaries were known. The court also noted that the private developer was chosen from a group of applicants and that the other private beneficiaries of the project were still unknown.

This legal case concerns the government's use of eminent domain to take private properties in New London, Connecticut for economic development. The dissenting opinion argues that this violates the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which requires just compensation and limits eminent domain to public use only. The Supreme Court has identified three categories of takings that comply with the public use requirement, but courts must still review legislative judgments to ensure the Public Use Clause retains meaning. The Court has previously upheld takings within blighted neighborhoods and emphasized the importance of deferring to legislative judgments about public purpose. The Court reserved a narrow role for courts to play in reviewing a legislature's judgment of what constitutes a public use to protect against purely private takings.

Justice Thomas dissents from the Court's decision to uphold the taking of private property for "economic development" purposes, arguing that it effectively erases the Public Use Clause from the Constitution. He believes that the Public Use Clause is a meaningful limit on the government's eminent domain power and that the Court's interpretation of it has strayed from its original meaning. Justice Thomas would reconsider previous cases that have weakened the Clause's original intent. The Public Use Clause in the Takings Clause is an express limit on the government's power of eminent domain, and requires the government to take property only for public use. The current interpretation of the Public Use Clause, which allows for takings for a "public purpose," was adopted without much consideration of the Clause's history and original meaning. This interpretation is based on weak doctrinal foundations and is not susceptible to principled application. The Court's reliance on this standard is ill-advised and should be reconsidered.