The legal case involves a challenge to the University of Michigan Law School's admissions policy, which considers race as a factor in achieving diversity. The Supreme Court recognizes that student body diversity is a compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in university admissions. The Law School's admissions program is a narrowly tailored plan that uses race in a flexible, nonmechanical way, and does not employ quotas or separate admissions tracks for certain racial groups. The Law School conducts a highly individualized, holistic review of each applicant's file, giving serious consideration to all the ways an applicant might contribute to a diverse educational environment. The Law School affords this individualized consideration to applicants of all races, and there is no policy of automatic acceptance or rejection based on any single "soft" variable. The Law School's admissions policy is flexible enough to consider all pertinent elements of diversity in light of the particular qualifications of each applicant, and to place them on the same footing for consideration, although not necessarily according them the same weight. The Court of Appeals overturned the District Court's ruling, stating that diversity was a compelling state interest and that the Law School's use of race was narrowly tailored.

The Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice Ginsburg and agreed upon by Justice Breyer, states that affirmative action programs must have a logical end point, in line with international understanding. The Court recognizes that while it has been 25 years since the use of race to promote student body diversity in public higher education was approved, conscious and unconscious race bias, as well as rank discrimination based on race, still exist in the United States. The Court acknowledges that special measures to ensure the development and protection of certain racial groups are endorsed, but these measures should not maintain unequal or separate rights for different racial groups after achieving their objectives. Similarly, temporary special measures to accelerate equality should be discontinued when the objectives of equality of opportunity and treatment have been achieved.

Justice Scalia partially dissents with the opinion of The Chief Justice in the University of Michigan Law School case, arguing that the school's "critical mass" justification for race-based discrimination is a cover-up for racially proportionate admissions. He believes that the supposed "educational benefit" of racial discrimination is not unique and can be learned in other settings. Justice Scalia suggests that the Grutter-Gratz split decision will lead to prolonged controversy and litigation, challenging the educational benefits of diversity and the commitment to diversity. He believes that the Constitution prohibits government discrimination on the basis of race, and state-provided education is no exception.

The author disagrees with the majority's decision to allow the University of Michigan Law School to use racial discrimination in admissions, arguing that it violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. The author believes that the Court's deference to the Law School is inconsistent with the concept of "strict scrutiny" and that racial discrimination is not an acceptable solution to the problems caused by the Law School's elitist admissions policy. However, the author agrees with the Court's decision to approve only one racial classification and that racial discrimination in higher education admissions will be illegal in 25 years. The author argues that the Constitution should be interpreted consistently over time and that the Law School's racial discrimination should be subjected to strict scrutiny. The strict scrutiny standard, which allows for racial discrimination in cases of pressing public necessity, has its origins in the Korematsu v. United States ruling. The standard is also known as "compelling governmental interest" and has only been upheld in cases of national security and remedying past discrimination that the government is accountable for. However, even in such cases, the use of race must be carefully tailored. The Supreme Court has rejected certain interests as justifications for racial discrimination, including a collective-bargaining agreement that favored certain minority races and child custody determinations based on race. The Court has also rejected an interest in remedying general societal discrimination as a justification for race discrimination.

The dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, argues that the University of Michigan Law School's use of race in its admissions process is unconstitutional racial balancing and not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest. The Law School's admission practices for underrepresented minority groups are not consistent with its goal of achieving a "critical mass" of diversity. The Court has applied strict scrutiny analysis to any preference based on racial or ethnic criteria, requiring a compelling state interest demonstrated with greater precision than any alternative means. The Respondents justify the Law School's use of race by claiming that a "critical mass" of underrepresented minorities is needed to obtain educational benefits, but the dissenting opinion argues that the Law School's means do not relate to its asserted goal. The Law School's program of achieving a "critical mass" of underrepresented minority groups is not consistent with its actual admissions practices, and the Respondents offer no race-specific reasons for these disparities. The Court's application of strict scrutiny review in this case is unprecedented in its deference.

The dissenting opinions of Justices Kennedy and Thomas in a legal case involving the University of Michigan Law School's admissions policy highlight the importance of strict scrutiny in reviewing the use of race as a factor in university admissions. Justice Thomas criticizes the use of the concept of critical mass, which he argues is similar to quotas and inconsistent with individual consideration. The Law School's narrow fluctuation band in the percentage of enrolled minority students raises an inference that it subverted individual determination, and strict scrutiny requires the Law School to overcome this inference. The Law School failed to provide guidelines to its admissions personnel on how to reconcile individual assessment with the directive to admit a critical mass of minority students, and the daily consideration of racial breakdown of admitted students is not a feature of affirmative-action programs used by other institutions of higher learning.