Gratz v. Bollinger was a class-action lawsuit filed in 1997 alleging that the University of Michigan's use of racial preferences in undergraduate admissions violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, or 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The Supreme Court found that the University's use of race and ethnicity as factors in their admissions process was in violation of these constitutional and statutory provisions. The University of Michigan made changes to its admissions guidelines during the relevant period of the lawsuit, but the Court reversed the portion of the District Court's decision upholding the guidelines. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment regarding liability, with Petitioners arguing that the University's use of race in admissions violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Respondents argued that the consideration of race as a factor in admissions could serve a compelling government interest, specifically the educational benefits of a diverse student body, and that the university's program was narrowly tailored to serve that interest. Respondent-intervenors argued that the University had a compelling interest in remedying past and current discrimination against minorities.

The Supreme Court found that the University of Michigan's use of race in undergraduate admissions violated equal protection rights. The District Court erred in certifying the class-action challenge to the University's consideration of race in undergraduate admissions. The University's use of race in its current freshman admissions policy is not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest in diversity. The admissions program for the College of Literature, Science, and the Arts is a non-individualized, mechanical system that does not provide necessary individualized consideration. The use of racial discrimination in higher education admissions is not categorically prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause, but a university cannot racially discriminate between the groups constituting the critical mass. The District Court's decision is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Justice Stevens dissents from the Court's decision because the petitioners lack standing to bring the action. The article discusses the constitutionality of race-conscious admissions schemes and compares the Grutter and Bakke guidelines. The court allows colleges to consider race as a factor in admissions to increase diversity, but not to reserve minority places. The use of a 20-point system to consider race in admissions does not make it a decisive factor. The judgment granting summary judgment to the college should be affirmed, but since there is no proper standing, the judgment should be vacated for lack of jurisdiction. Justice Ginsburg dissents, arguing that the University of Michigan's admissions policy, which considers race as one of many factors and not as a sole determining factor, is constitutional. The policy is necessary to address historical discrimination against certain groups. The lower court did not err in upholding the policy.