The case involves journalist William Gasperini who sued for breach of contract, conversion, and negligence, and was awarded $450,000 in compensatory damages by a jury. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals found the jury's verdict materially deviated from reasonable compensation and ordered a new trial unless Gasperini agreed to an award of $100,000. The case raises the question of the standard for measuring the excessiveness of a jury's verdict in a state law damages action. The Supreme Court ruled that New York's "deviates materially" standard, as codified in CPLR § 5501(c), is substantive and can be applied in federal court without violating the Seventh Amendment's Reexamination Clause. Appellate review for abuse of discretion is necessary and proper to ensure fair administration of justice, and nothing in the Seventh Amendment precludes appellate review of the trial judge's denial of a motion to set aside a jury verdict as excessive.

Justice Stevens dissents from the majority's decision and believes that federal appellate courts have the power to decide if a jury's damages award exceeds a limit set by state law. However, he agrees that federal courts must apply state-law ceilings on allowable damages in diversity cases governed by New York law. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit correctly concluded that New York's excessiveness standard applies in federal court in diversity cases controlled by New York law. The majority agrees that New York law establishes the size of the damages that may be awarded but chooses to vacate and remand. The majority holds that a federal court of appeals should review for abuse of discretion a district court's decision to deny a motion for a new trial based on a jury's excessive award. The District Court should be given the opportunity to apply the "deviates materially" standard that New York law imposes. The Court of Appeals did not reexamine any fact determined by a jury, but merely identified that portion of the judgment that constitutes "unlawful excess."

The dissenting opinion in this case argues that federal appellate courts should not be allowed to review district court denials of motions for new trials based on the weight of the evidence, as it contradicts the Seventh Amendment's principles. The Court's decision to allow such reviews is a departure from historical common law practices and violates the limited authority of appellate courts to determine questions of law, not fact. The Court's analysis is insufficient, and there is no precedent supporting the practice of appellate weight-of-the-evidence review. The Court orders the case to be remanded to the District Court to test the jury's verdict against a state standard, which contradicts the principle that the proper role of trial and appellate courts in the federal system in reviewing the size of jury verdicts is a matter of federal law. The Court overrules a previous case and gives the state standard dispositive effect, but the writer disagrees with how it is categorized as a substantive rule under Erie doctrine.