The legal case involves a dispute between Continental Can Company and the Chicago Truck Drivers Pension Fund over withdrawal payments. Continental argues that it should not have to make payments unless "substantially all" of the Fund's assets come from employers primarily engaged in the trucking industry. An arbitrator determined that 61.6% of the Fund's assets are attributable to such employers, but Continental argues that "substantially all" means 85%. The district court enforced the arbitrator's award, citing previous cases that have defined "substantially all" as meaning more than 85%. The origin of the relevant statute, 29 U.S.C. § 1383(d)(2), suggests that "substantially all" may be an attractive standard because it allows Members of Congress to say different things to different interest groups. The House and Senate passed a bill in 1980 to establish a system of withdrawal liability for underfunded pension plans, which did not exclude the trucking industry. However, the Senate's bill included a special rule for the trucking business, in the exact language that became § 4203(d)(2). The interpretation of "substantially all" as meaning at least 85% of contributions to a pension plan are made by employers engaged in over the road and short haul trucking was based on its use in other provisions of the tax laws. Senator Durenberger explained why special treatment for the trucking industry is appropriate. After the House and Senate agreed to the language of § 4203(d)(2), it was implied for the first time that "substantially all" means "majority". Senator Durenberger inserted another statement into the Congressional Record clarifying his intent for the special withdrawal liability procedure for the trucking industry. The case highlights the importance of interpreting statutory language and the potential for ambiguity in legal terms.

The judge who concurs with the majority decision agrees with their judgment but disagrees with their analysis of legislative motive and operation. According to the judge, the Pension Fund's interpretation of "substantially all" in 29 U.S.C. § 1381 is supported by its plain meaning, which does not imply a bare majority. The judge also argues that examining the legislative history of the statute may not be appropriate or informative as the statute is clear and unambiguous. The judge cites Davis v. Michigan Dept. of the Treasury to support this point. Moreover, the judge notes that the legislative history of § 1381 has a neutral impact on the case, and Continental's reliance on post-enactment statements is not favored. The arbitrator's interpretation of "substantially all" is consistent with the IRS's use of the term in different contexts. The fact that two district courts in the Seventh Circuit have taken a different view than Continental is enough to dispose of the case.