The case of Campbell v. Seaman established that if a person's manufacturing process generates harmful gases that damage their neighbor's trees and vegetation, it constitutes a nuisance and the injured party can sue for damages and an injunction to stop the process. The type of trees or shrubbery damaged is irrelevant, and occasional harm is enough to warrant an injunction. However, the fact that the brick yard was in use before the plaintiff purchased their land does not affect their right to an injunction. Only a continuous use of twenty years can establish a prescriptive right to continue a nuisance. A writ of injunction is a legal tool used to prevent irreversible harm and excessive legal proceedings. If a judgment's injunction provisions go beyond the scope of the report, the appropriate action is to file a motion to set aside or correct the judgment.

In this case, the plaintiffs owned land and a dwelling-house, which they improved over the years. The defendant owned a brick-yard nearby and used anthracite coal to burn bricks, which generated sulphuric acid gas that damaged the plaintiffs' trees and vines. The gas had killed and destroyed valuable trees and caused damage to grape vines and plum trees, resulting in estimated damages of $500 for the years 1869 and 1870. The gas escaped and contaminated the plaintiff's land only when the wind was blowing from the south during the last two days of kiln burning.

Property owners have the right to use their property as they see fit, but this right is subject to the principle of not causing harm to others or their property. Property owners must use their property in a reasonable manner that does not cause unnecessary harm or annoyance to their neighbors. If they use their property in an unreasonable or unlawful way that causes material annoyance or harm to their neighbor, they are guilty of a nuisance and are responsible for any resulting damage. In this case, the defendant's brick burning was a nuisance to the plaintiffs. The lawfulness of brick burning depends on the circumstances of each case, and an injunction cannot be granted without proof that the business is conducted in a way that causes a nuisance to the plaintiff. However, if a lower court errs in granting an injunction, the appropriate action is to file a motion to set aside or correct the judgment.

Defendants cannot burn bricks near residential areas if it causes damage or annoyance, even if it's a reasonable use of the property or has been carried on in the same locality for a long time. Brick burning within a certain distance of a plaintiff's residence is considered a nuisance, and brick-kilns built within 100 yards of a mansion-house are usually considered a nuisance. Injunctions are a common remedy to prevent irreparable injury, interminable litigation, and a multiplicity of suits. The court's discretion in granting or refusing an injunction is not arbitrary and can be corrected on appeal if improperly exercised. In this case, the remedy at law was not adequate, and the irreparable harm justifies the issuance of an injunction. The destruction of ornamental trees, flowers, and vines surrounding a mansion cannot be compensated for as their value cannot be estimated in dollars and cents. The fact that the defendant's brick-yard was in use before the plaintiffs bought their land is irrelevant, and acquiescence of less than twenty years cannot bar a complaint of a nuisance unless there is evidence of estoppel.

The plaintiffs are not guilty of laches, and the defendant's claim of prescriptive right to burn bricks is not valid. An injunction may be granted even if the defendant will suffer a large loss from being restrained if the damage to the plaintiff from a nuisance is substantial. The court's decision will not harm the brick making industry as there are other places where bricks can be made without causing harm to residents. The objection to the decision made by two judges is not valid, and the judgment is affirmed.