The court ruled that unsolicited mass emails that do not harm or impair the recipient's computer system do not constitute trespass to chattels. However, injunctive relief can still be granted for the use of another's personal property without proof of actual injury. The defendant is only liable for the harm caused by the interference, not the full value of the property. The court will review the grant of summary judgment de novo. Recent district court decisions have found that unauthorized robotic data collection from a company's publicly accessible website may be considered a trespass if it poses a threat of irreparable harm. Flooding a server with search robots can constitute a trespass, while insufficient evidence of harm to the chattel will not be actionable. This decision does not affect the legal remedies available to Internet service providers against senders of unsolicited commercial bulk e-mail.

The legal case discusses whether occasional personal calls to a mobile phone, despite the owner's objection, constitute the tort of trespass to chattels. The court concludes that it only qualifies as trespass if the calls damage the phone or significantly impair its usefulness or availability. The case also discusses unsolicited bulk email and its impact on electronic communication and workplace productivity. The court concludes that to establish the tort of trespass to chattels in California, the plaintiff must prove damage to personal property or actual or threatened impairment of the ability to use that property. In this case, Intel Corporation has not shown that the defendant's occasional bulk email messages have caused damage or significant impairment to its computer system, and therefore, the tort of trespass to chattels has not been established. The court suggests practical and legal options available to Intel Corporation in response to unsolicited bulk email from the defendant, Kourosh Kenneth Hamidi. The court also notes that the Legislature is studying the problems caused by bulk emails and may craft legislation to address these issues. The Court of Appeal's judgment is reversed.

Justice Brown dissents from the majority's decision in a case where candidate A spray painted a message on campaign vehicles belonging to candidate B. Brown argues that an injunction should be granted to prevent further damage and costs. The court ruled that a company has the right to control the use of its property, including its computer system, and exclude unwanted speech. Recipients have the right to reject messages for any subjective reason, including annoyance or discomfort at their content. An injunction to prevent a trespass to chattels is an appropriate means of enforcement for the continuing violation of property rights. The Supreme Court of California denied Intel any remedy despite acknowledging that Hamidi does not have a right to have his messages transmitted by Intel. An injunction for trespass to chattels remains an appropriate means of enforcement. The chattel is inviolable, and the trespassee need not tolerate even harmless interference, and the possessor may use reasonable force to prevent it. The Tillman v. Vance case upheld a homeowner's right to prevent unwanted delivery of newspapers or e-mails onto their property, regardless of content or volume, and authorized injunctive relief. The CompuServe case authorized an injunction to prevent the delivery of unsolicited e-mails, based on the defendant's intentional use of the plaintiff's proprietary computer equipment without consent. The eBay case held that conduct amounting to intermeddling or use of another's personal property is sufficient to establish a cause of action for trespass to chattel. The Oyster Software case clarified that the interference need not be substantial, and the defendant's conduct amounted to "use" of the plaintiff's computer.

The legal case involves the application of the tort of trespass to chattels to unwanted electronic mail that does not physically harm the recipient's computer system. The majority opinion concluded that it does not apply, but Justice Mosk disagrees. The trial court found that the repeated transmission of bulk e-mails by Hamidi to Intel's employees on its proprietary confidential e-mail lists constitutes an actionable trespass to chattels. The court granted summary judgment and a permanent injunction in favor of Intel, finding that Hamidi's intrusion had resulted in the expenditure of company resources to seek to block his mailings and to address employee concerns about the mailings. The court concluded that Intel had been injured by diminished employee productivity and in devoting company resources to blocking efforts and to addressing employees about Hamidi's e-mails. The court further found that the "massive" intrusions had impaired the value to Intel of its e-mail system. The author supports the trial court's finding that Intel was significantly harmed by costs incurred to hinder the messages and impaired productivity of its employees. The author also supports the application of the tort of trespass to chattels in this situation, as determined by the trial court and the Court of Appeal.