The case involves Griswold and Buxton, who were arrested for providing contraception advice to married couples. They challenged the constitutionality of Connecticut statutes that criminalize the provision of contraception advice and services. The Supreme Court held that the appellants had standing to assert the constitutional rights of the married couples they served, as their relationship with the couples was of a confidential nature. The Court recognized that the law in question directly affects the intimate relationship between husband and wife and their physician's role in one aspect of that relation. The Court established a penumbra of privacy protection under the First Amendment, which extends to non-political associations that benefit members socially, legally, or economically. The Court has reaffirmed the principles established in Pierce v. Society of Sisters and Meyer v. Nebraska. The Court declined to use Lochner v. New York as a guide in evaluating the constitutionality of the law in question.

The Ninth Amendment protects fundamental personal rights beyond those listed in the first eight amendments, including the right of privacy. The right to be left alone, the right to marry, establish a home, and raise children, and the privacy and integrity of the marital relationship are fundamental aspects of family life protected by the Constitution. Laws outlawing voluntary birth control by married persons unjustifiably intrude upon rights of marital privacy which are constitutionally protected. The Ninth Amendment must be given real effect and considered in the interpretation of the Constitution to protect fundamental personal rights and liberties.

Justice Harlan disagrees with the Court's opinion that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment can only be applied if the statute violates a right guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. He believes that the incorporation doctrine should not be used to restrict the reach of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process. The constitutional inquiry in this case should focus on whether the Connecticut statute violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by infringing on basic values that are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. The judge believes that the statute does violate the Due Process Clause. The "incorporation" approach taken by Justices Black and Stewart in this case is not based on historical reasons, but on the idea that judges will be confined to interpreting specific constitutional provisions and prevented from introducing their own personal beliefs about constitutional rights and wrongs into the vague language of the Due Process Clause.

The Connecticut law prohibiting married couples from using birth control violates their liberty without due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. The right to marry, establish a home, bring up children, and direct their upbringing and education are basic civil rights that the state cannot enter without substantial justification. The statute bears a substantial burden of justification when attacked under the Fourteenth Amendment, and statutes regulating sensitive areas of liberty require "strict scrutiny." The State may prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest which is compelling. However, such statutes are not invalid under the Due Process Clause if they are reasonably necessary for the effectuation of a legitimate and substantial state interest and not arbitrary or capricious in application.

Justice Black dissents from the majority opinion that the Connecticut law banning the use of contraceptives is unconstitutional. He argues that the First Amendment does not protect conduct that violates the law, even if speech is used in carrying out that conduct. He also believes that the Court's reference to a constitutional "right of privacy" is misleading, as there is no specific provision in the Constitution that guarantees such a right. Instead, he suggests that certain constitutional provisions, such as the Fourth Amendment, should not be narrowly interpreted as protecting only privacy. The dissenting justice argues that using broad and ambiguous terms like "privacy" as a substitute for specific constitutional guarantees can dilute or expand the scope of the right. He believes that courts should adhere to the simple language of the Constitution and avoid using substitute words that can be interpreted in various ways. The justice disagrees with the Court's judgment that the Connecticut law is unconstitutional based on a constitutional "right of privacy." He also disagrees with his colleagues' interpretation of the Due Process Clause and the Ninth Amendment, arguing that they cannot be used as a basis for invalidating any legislative act that judges find irrational, unreasonable, or offensive.

Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion disagrees with the majority's decision to strike down Connecticut's law prohibiting the use of contraceptives. The justice finds that the law does not violate any specific Amendment to the United States Constitution, including the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments, and the Ninth Amendment. The justice questions the Court's assertion that the right of privacy is created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees and asks which provision of the Constitution makes the state law invalid. The justice notes that the Due Process Clause is not used to determine the appropriateness of state laws, as courts must respect the decisions of elected legislative bodies.